AT&T divestiture exposed the folly of the FCC’s pricing policy and forced it to reduce access charges after 1984.Ironically, but for inefficient regulatory “universal service” pricing, entry into long distance may not have begun occurred in 1970s.
and elsewhere, but did not require isolation of the local bottleneck.
Simple rule requiring origination and termination of traffic over incumbents’ switches worked well in U.S. Long Distance Rates Fell Largely Because FCC Reduced Switched Access RatesĬompetition in Long Distance Market Did Not Require “Isolating the Bottleneck” through Vertical Divestiture Long Distance Rates Fell More Rapidly in EU and Canada without Divestiture EU liberalized telecom services in 1998. Canada liberalized long distance services in 1992-93. example, most countries simply required incumbents to originate and terminate entrants’ calls (“equal access”). But was vertical divestiture, i.e., isolation of the network monopoly bottleneck, necessary to obtain competitive results in long distance and terminal equipment?ĭespite the Apparent Success of AT&T Decree, No Other Country Pursued Vertical Divestiture. “Inverse Ramsey” regulatory pricing of local and long distance services created incentives for entry and for AT&T to attempt to block it. Section 2 case focused on use of these monopoly “bottlenecks” to extend monopoly into long-distance and terminal-equipment markets. AT&T’s local telephone monopolies accounted for 80-85% of access lines in 1982. But was increased long distance competition due to vertical divestiture?. Near-term result: long-distance services increased and U.S. The decree required vertical divestiture of Bell operating companies and equal-access obligations for divested local companies. The 1982 AT&T decree is the major (apparent) exception. 
AT&T (1982) Is Generally Viewed as Most Successful of Major Section 2 Cases Kirkwood (ed.), Antitrust Law and Economics, Vol. Elzinga (2004), “Injunctive Relief in Sherman Act Monopolization Cases,” in John B. Crandall and Clifford Winston (2003), “Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. Crandall (2001), “The Failure of Structural Remedies in Sherman Act Monopolization Cases,” Oregon Law Review, Vol.
No empirical evidence of increased output or lower prices following imposition of the decrees in 18 of 19 cases studied. Similar lack of benefits found by Crandall and Elzinga (2004) in examination of injunctive relief. In reviews of major monopolization cases, Crandall (2001) and Crandall and Winston (2003) find little evidence of consumer benefit from structural remedies. Little Empirical Evidence that Section 2 Decrees Have Improved Consumer Welfare For an official signed copy, please contact the Antitrust Documents Group. #At&t’s monopoly over long distance pdf
To view the PDF you will need Acrobat Reader, which may be downloaded from the Adobe site. This document is available in three formats: this web page (for browsing content), PDF (comparable to original document formatting), and PowerPoint.
0 kommentar(er)
